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ealth care reform now 
heads the U.S. domestic 
agenda, but this genera- 
tion of policymakers may 
be less successful than its predeces- 
sors in effecting major changes. The 
president wants universal coverage 
and a wider array of services. Key 
members of both parties, such as Sen- 
ators Dole and Moynihan, resist any- 
thing so grandiose. “Yes, there are 
problems,” declared the Republican 
congressional leadership. “But there’s 
not an emergency that requires a 
complete overhaul of the medical sys- 
tem.”’ The current debate pits visions 
of justice and fairness against fears 
that reforms may prove more costly 
and cumbersome than maintaining 
the status quo. 
Promoting “the general welfare” is 
tough in a country where progress is 
measured incrementally. Advances 
occur in fits and turns, “watersheds” 
alternate with retrenchments. “The 
two parties which divide the state, the 
party of Conservatism and that of In- 
novation are very old. . . . Reform is 
affirmative, conservatism negative,” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson observed in 
1841. “The Conservative assumes 
sickness as a necessity, and his social 
frame is a hospital. . . . Reform con- 
verses with possibilities, perchance 
with impossibilities.” In this dialectic, 
“Innovation is the salient energy; 
Conservatism the pause on the last 
movement”* 
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Reformism’s ebb and flow was not 
a uniquely American characteristic; 
liberals fought conservatives every- 
where. But Emerson claimed that 
US. politics had generational under- 
pinnings. Fresh ideas came from new 
blood, from reformers surmounting 
old ways and vested interests-“rest, 
conservatism, appropriation, inertia; 
not newness, not the way onwarcLns 
Partisan battles here were ideologi- 
cal, waged by forward-looking mem- 
bers of a rising generation against the 
elderly guardians of the established 
order. 
Sometimes, of course, members of 
the same cohort represented the in- 
terests of innovation and conserva- 
tism. Debating among themselves a 
generation earlier, for instance, the 
Founding Fathers wrestled with how 
to balance the creative policy recom- 
mendations advanced by leaders 
coming into their own and the pru- 
dent voices of those who valued the 
steady hand of tradition. From the 
late 1780s until his death, Thomas 
Jefferson stressed that each genera- 
tion had “the right to direct what is 
the concern of themselves alone, and 
to declare the law of that direction . . . 
to make the Constitution what they 
think will be best for themselves.” 
Jefferson wrote in aletter in 1816 that 
the Constitution should make provi- 
sions for its own revision every nine- 
teen or twenty years, “so that it may 
be handed on, with periodical re- 
pairs, from generation to generation, 
to the end of time.”4 
James Madison, in contrast, 
stressed the importance of continuity 
in transferring rights and responsi- 
bilities from generation to genera- 
tion. “There seems then to be a foun- 
dation in the nature of things, in the 
relation which one generation bears 
to another, for the heat of obliga- 
tion from one to another,” Madison 
wrote to his neighbor at Monticello in 
1’790. “Equity requires i t .  . . [and] 
good is promoted by it.”5 Given 
humans’ innate capacity for selfish- 
ness and opportunism, Madison re- 
lied on “traditional” convention- 
instilling a sense of duty in the citi- 
zenry, honoring contracts that were 
legitimately made by representative 
governments-to dilute the naivete 
of political neophytes and to mitigate 
the establishment’s abuse of power. 
At st i l l  other critical moments in 
our history, U.S. politicians have 
muted inter- and intragenerational 
disagreements over policy differ- 
ences. Lawmakers in the depths of 
the Great Depression emphasized that 
“relief, reform, and reconstruction” 
actually offered the best way to pre- 
serve the core of the American experi- 
ment. Thus, in bringing together ex- 
perts to draft social security legisla- 
tion, Franklin Delano Roosevelt de- 
clared: 
Our task of reconstruction does 
not require the creation of new 
and strange values. It is rather the 
finding of the way once more to 
known, but to some degree for- 
gotten, ideals and values. If the 
means and details are in some 
instances new, the objectives are 
as permanent as human nature? 
The landmark Social Security Act of 
1935 passed because it broadly a p  
pealed to the nation’s “vital center.” 
Provisions for the indigent, the blind, 
and the elderly, as well as the funds 
earmarked for research and training, 
were all designed to give citizens new 
entitlements. The measure buttressed 
the traditional support that children 
owed their parents while enabling fu- 
ture generations to save for their re- 
tirement years. 
FDR’s blue-ribbon panel realized 
that illness was one of the major 
causes of economic insecurity. By 
their estimates, one-third to onehalf 
of all dependency in the U.S. in “nor- 
mal times” stemmed from the eco- 
nomic consequences of illness. Mas- 
sive unemployment and cutbacks in 
services during the Depression, more- 
over, reduced the access of lower- 
income workers and their families to 
physicians and health care institu- 
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tions. Mindful both of the progres 
sives’ success in securing legislation to 
compensate against income losses 
due to industrial accidents and their 
failure to enact compulsory insur- 
ance against sickness, New Deal re- 
formers set the stage for innovation: 
Insurance against the costs of sick- 
ness is neither new nor novel. In 
the United States we have had a 
long experience with sickness in- 
surance both on a nonprofit and 
commercial basis. Both forms 
have been inadequate with re- 
spect to the protection they fur- 
nish, and the latter-commercial 
insurance-has in addition been 
too expensive for people of small 
means. Voluntary insurance holds 
no promise of being much more 
effective in the near future than it 
has been in the past’ 
After deciding not to include health 
care insurance in its omnibus legisla- 
tion, the Committee on Economic 
Security, as a “first and most inexpen- 
sive step in furnishing economic secu- 
rity against illness,” requested funds 
to prevent sickness. Grants-in-aid 
were to provide public health services 
in areas where none existed. (In 1933, 
only a sixth of the nation’s counties 
had full-time health supervision.) 
Funds were allocated to train more 
personnel. (Only 21 percent of the 
existing local departments were pro- 
viding “a satisfactory minimum” stan- 
dard in dealing with health-related 
problems.) 
Noting that “nearly every large and 
industrial country of the world ex- 
cept the United States has applied 
the principle of insurance to the eco- 
nomic r isks  of illness,”* the commit- 
tee charted a pragmatic agenda for 
their successors. They envisioned a 
health system that pooled risks. 
Policymakers set a 4.5 percent cap on 
a family’s contribution for medical 
coverage. The medical profession 
would control personnel and ser- 
vices, and negotiate fees. Services 
would be administered on a statewide 
basis, with the federal government es- 
tablishing national standards and 
providing necessary subsidies. Philo- 
sophically and structurally, the com- 
mittee’s blueprint for health care re- 
form meshed with the logic and form 
of its Social Security Act. 
As was the case with New Deal in- 
come-maintenance programs, age- 
specific differences in people’s health 
status were acknowledge but not ac- 
centuated “With the changing age 
composition of our population the 
task of health conservation must be 
broadened to include adults as well 
as ~hildren.”~ Reformers ultimately 
hoped to reduce every cohort’s risk 
by providing universal coverage over 
the life course. Faced with limited re- 
sources and considerable opposition, 
they opted for an incremental a p  
proach, addressing needs that could 
be remedied with the least political 
cost. 
New federal investments, incen- 
tives, and rulings restructured the 
nation’s health care institutions after 
World War II. The Veterans Adminis 
tration, which operated the largest 
hospital system in the US., became 
the major training site for physicians 
and nurses. The National Institutes of 
Health grew into the world’s largest 
center for biomedical research. The 
Hill-Burton Act (1946) provided bil- 
lions for hospital construction, which 
increased the number of beds avail- 
able in low-income states and middle 
America. Changes in the tax code dur- 
ing the 1950s exempted employers’ 
contributions to health benefit plans. 
By 1954, 12 million union members 
and their 17 million dependents en- 
joyed Blue Cross/Blue Shield cover- 
age. Some workers took advantage 
of prepaid group yactice options 
like the Kaiser plan. 
As conservatives and innovators in 
each Congress haggled over details, 
additional health care benefits were 
gradually extended to certain classes 
of Social Security recipients. The 
1950 amendments provided means- 
tested payments to the disabled. 
Broader disability provisions were 
added during the Eisenhower years 
for those too young to retire but in- 
capable of staying in the labor force. 
The Kerr-Mills Act (1960) allocated 
funds for people not on public relief 
who could not pay for necessary 
medical treatments. Each legislative 
victory heightened public interest 
in medical insurance, which in turn 
presaged another wave of health care 
innovation in Washington. 
“We can-we must-strive now to 
ensure the availability and accessi- 
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bility to the best health care for all 
Americans regardless of age or geo- 
graphy or economic status,” pro- 
claimed Lyndon Baines Johnson, set- 
ting a major goal for his Great 
Society:’ A new generation of re- 
formers focused on the needs of the 
elderly, who constituted the poorest 
and sickest segment of society. In 
1965, the president signed Medicare 
into law. The measure extended 
hospital insurance to Social Security 
beneficiaries, and featured a volun- 
tary plan to cover physicians’ bills. 
Just as old-age assistance in 1935 had 
been considered a necessary comple- 
ment to old-age insurance, so too 
Medicaid (which provided medical 
services for welfare recipients of all  
ages) was enacted in the shadow of 
Medicare. Incrementalism continued. 
Social Security amendments in 1972 
permitted reimbursements for kid- 
ney dialysis and transplants, chiro- 
practic and podiatry services under 
Medicare, and liberalized Medicaid 
payments for nursing home care. 
These 1972 amendments, however, 
also signaled Congress’s first efforts 
to limit health care outlays. Medicare 
authorized certain services on a capi- 
tation basis and established review 
boards to monitor quality and utiliza- 
tion of resources. Medicaid permitted 
states to impose copayment require- 
ments on recipients.’* Ford’s and 
Carter’s calls for greater stringency 
floundered. Ronald Reagan was the 
first president to succeed in framing 
the health care debate in economic 
terms. Congress, however, was loath 
to consider measures that might 
hurt the poor and the elderly. The 
Catastrophic Coverage Act (1988) 
provided new benefits in a seemingly 
budget-neutral fashion. But Congress 
repealed the measure two years later 
when faced with considerable back- 
lash from the very constituency it 
meant to help. That relatively f l u -  
ent senior citizens were unwilling to 
pay for catastrophic coverage ex- 
posed intragenerational cleavages in 
the electorate. 
The fight over catastrophic in- 
surance was symptomatic of larger 
fiscal woes, structural dysfunction, 
and stereotypic reasoning. Increases 
in life expectancy were a source of 
national pride, but population aging 
was scary: it raised the specter of ad- 
